Ever since the Kuomintang (KMT) fled to the island of Taiwan in 1949, it has been the sole party in power until moves towards democratization in the 80s. While the present liberal democracy status of Taiwan is unquestionable, there are still remnants from the old party rule which prevents further democratization in Taiwanese politics. Every step of the way from the establishment of the Republic of China in Taiwan, to its eventual democratization, local factionalism has been a key element in the KMT’s hold on power and electoral strategy. It has been argued that while the support for the Democratical Progress Party (DPP) party, the current party in power, is based in ideology, the KMT’s support is still “faction based,” as in that it relies on local factional mobilization to elect officials. (Bosco 1994, p. 31) Despite its undemocratic nature, as it does not rely on the democratic process to get officials elected, in fact this was one of the factors which helped the Taiwanese political system to democratize since the party was willing to let political change happen knowing it had the network necessary to get their politicians elected. (Bosco 1994, p. 30) However, in the modern day, the KMT has still yet to become a “normal” party, since it still holds on to its strong local factional presence and mobilization strategies.

Faction

The definition for “faction” used here, is that of Bosco’s study into the fac- tions of Taiwan, where he notes it to be a “political conflict group that are not corporate and whose members are recruited by a leader on diverse princi- ples.” (Bosco 2016, p. 1) Furthermore a “local faction” is a set of interpersonal networks that function, for political purposes, in the local as opposed to the national arena. (Chen 2016, p. 224) These factions originate from pre-existing networks in the local level even before the KMT’s escape to the island. But they formed into existence around when the very first elections were held at the local level. They are usually limited to the county and township level, because the KMT wanted to eliminate any factionalism greater than the county level. These factions then mobilize votes in the village level through local leaders.

When the KMT first moved to Taiwan, they were an outsider to the island and had no connection with the locals. As a way to build legitimacy and connect with the local population, the KMT co-opted the local loose personal relations which already existed on the local level to mobilize them to vote in their favor in elections. As return, the KMT would provide various economic benefits. (Chen 2016) It also provided a look of democracy for the KMT government which was in alliance with other democratic states. (Cheng 1989, p. 478)

Factional leaders are nearly all members of the KMT, and are more cohesive than factions than other countries. (Bosco 2016, p. 2) Ever since their co- option, local factions have been critical to sustaining the KMT rule on the island. During the latter half of the KMT rule on the island, nearly 60% of KMT nominated candidates were faction affiliated. The members of the faction can be expected to receive rewards should they be victorious, especially in terms of jobs which is the most common patronage type. (Bosco 2016, p. 8) There are also cases of vote buying wherein a rural voter may receive gifts, including cash in hongbaos, “ren envelopes,” for supporting a certain candidate.

All this worked to establish a strictly local system of clientelism between the KMT party and local leaders, as well the voters they mobilize.

Transition to Democracy

The client system worked well to consolidate the KMT’s political power over Taiwanese society, which in turn was instrumental in its path to economic development. (Cheng 1989, p. 480) Their GDP was growing at an average rate of 9% from 1960 to 1980. This led to a new middle class, but not only that the demographics of those with economic power were now mainly the Taiwanese, not the mainlander demographic of those in political power. (Cheng 1989, p. 483) This new demographic educated in the social sciences, demanded for a liberal democracy to take place in the Taiwanese government structure.

In response to these demands, the KMT attempted to co-opt the activists by ceding some political reforms such as more supplementary elections. The KMT still banned opposition parties, and to prevent the opposition forces from organizing themselves into parties, they instead tried to send them through the KMT system as new candidates. (Cheng 1989, p. 487) This might have backfired however as this meant that soon enough there were Taiwanese political elites who had much more of a sense of a separate Taiwanese identity than a Chinese one. Through a careful and complicated bargaining process between the growing opposition and the KMT, eventually the first competitive election in Taiwan’s history was held in 1986.

Another concession made by the KMT was to grant the local factions to form island-wide alliance whereas before they were restricted to the local counties and townships. This led to the development of factions around Taiwan which did not necessarily have to align themselves with the KMT, but which nonetheless still generally kept their old networks. (Chen 2016)

Current Day

In the current day, the local electoral advantages that the KMT enjoyed is still felt today. When it comes to island-wide elections, it is often the leading opposition party, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), who has the advantage since it relies on ideological and political appeal to gain voters. Those who have the education to think about political and ideological issues to vote are therefore likely to vote DPP. Factions also tend to be weaker in cities, since the social networks that a voter is tied is much more complex than in villages or counties. (Bosco 1994, p. 45-6) Both of these factors lead to the DPP appealing to urban voters in general who tend to be more educated and less susceptible to factionalism. Therefore the KMT has to rely more on its local factions to stay in power and hold on to seats.

A consequence of its relationship has been that factions has used its new- found independence, since it is no longer restricted to a locality, to gain a lever- age over the KMT. (Rigger 2005, p. 320 This means that the KMT is increasing relying on self-interested factions to hold on to power, and further strengthening the patron-client relationships. The KMT, during the 1991 National Assembly elections, even strunk the size of electoral districts, to lend more power to the factional mobilization strategy. (Bosco 1994, p. 59) This further strengthens the factions and local interests, and shows the KMT’s reliance on these factions for votes.

Despite Taiwan being a vibrant democracy today with competitive elections, the parties are still not on completely equal ground as they approach elections. The KMT’s political strategies from its party dictatorship era still hold in to- day’s elections. Factional mobilization strategy that relies on a patron-client system with a dominant party is even more important to the KMT now. This means that during elections, the strategy for both parties look different from each other. The DPP uses the democratic process of political campaigns and ideological arguments to win over voters in urban districts, while the KMT’s pol- itics are tied down to pleasing local leaders and giving out tributes to maintain their support.

There are still further changes which could be had to improve the democratic institutions in Taiwan. The KMT has relied on the factions to stay in power despite strong opposition up until now. But the system which relies on is one filled with corruption rather than a clear democratic process. Until the point in which the KMT can get rid of its factional reliance and compete with the DPP or any other party on the same level, the democratic transition away from the KMT is still not fully done.

References

Bosco, Joseph (1994). “Faction versus ideology: Mobilization strategies in Tai- wan’s elections”. In: The China Quarterly 137, pp. 28–62.
Bosco, Joseph (2016). “Taiwan factions: guanxi, patronage, and the state in local politics”. In: The Other Taiwan, 1945-92. Routledge, pp. 124–154.
Chen, Ming-tong (2016). “Local factions and elections in Taiwan’s democrati- zation”. In: Taiwan’s electoral politics and democratic transition: Riding the third wave. Routledge, pp. 174–192.
Cheng, Tun-jen (1989). “Democratizing the quasi-Leninist regime in Taiwan”. In: World politics 41.4, pp. 471–499.
Rigger, Shelley (2005). “Grassroots electoral organization and political reform in the ROC on Taiwan and Mexico”. In: The Awkward Embrace. Routledge, pp. 325–340.

Last modified on 2023-03-23