Hungary has experienced democratic backsliding in recent years, which stands out since it is a country in the EU, located at the center of Europe, and surrounded by strong democracies. Yet somehow, a strong wave of right-wing parties who openly declare themselves to be against “liberal democracy” has taken hold in the country, in stark contrast to the standard seen in the European Union. The prime minister of this party, Viktor Orbán declared that “illiberal democracy” is the country’s future, which led some to question what exactly this entails, and how such a concept has taken hold in a country surrounded by democracies.

This paper explores the origins of illiberalism as stemming from the socialist time period, the development of a paternalist political culture, as well as unique events in Hungary’s history that led to an illiberal democracy in Hungary. Second, the paper explores what exactly an “illiberal democracy” means and how it has worked out in Hungary.

Origins of Illiberal Democracy

The origins of illiberalism in Hungary begin from its socialist although some might argue that it originates even earlier from its lengthy history as a monarchy. During the socialist era, as a result of its policies, social equity was kept relatively stable and even. Another feature of the socialist system was the strong state institutions which built a culture of a demand for a strong state, even if at the same time, they distrusted the state. This built up a strong paternalist culture in Hungary and set the expectations they had for the state. 2017 polls in Hungary indicated that nearly one-third of Hungarians perceived there to be no fundamental differences between any political systems such as a “democracy” or “dictatorship”. (Bıró-Nagy 2017, p. 34)

Despite this, many Hungarians were hopeful about their transition to democracy. A major expectation that the Hungarians had for democracy was economic prosperity. Polls from the start of democratization in Hungary indicated that Hungarians believed that economic prosperity was just as important of a feature of democracy as free elections were. (Bıró-Nagy 2017, p. 34) However, these expectations would be shattered when after two decades of capitalism and liberal democracy in the Hungary resulted in widespread unemployment and a new class of plutocrats instead. Polls indicate that in 2017, nearly 72% of Hungarians believed that that the country was worse off than under socialism. (Bıró-Nagy 2017, p. 31)

With the stage set, several political and economic crises finally pushed the right-wing Fidesz government to become mainstream in Hungarian politics. This started off with the high degree of political polarization between the con- servative and socialist parties in Hungary. The private recording of the socialist party’s prime minister admitting in a profanity riddled speech that they had done nothing for the country and lied for years straight about the state of the country. (Magyar 2010) This led to the disillusionment of many of the Hungarian public and pushed them to vote for the opposition party, Fidesz.

Definition

The prime minister of Fidesz, Viktor Orbán, declared in a speech in 2010, that liberalism had failed in Hungary, and that their government was that of “illiberal democracy.” The exact definition of what exactly this terms entailed is confusing, but some clues are to be found in Orbán’s own speeches and the voters. Looking at what the voters understand the term to be, they say it’s a “rejection of the last 20 years of post-communism.” (Buzogány 2017, p. 1314)

As for Orbán himself, he states that Western liberalism is not suited for the culture of Hungarians, which is that of authoritarianism and collectivism. A major criticism he had of Western liberal democracy was that it had not led to the prosperity of the general population, and only worked to benefit the few, or the individual. In this way, illiberal democracy has a strong populist core to it.

Another inspiration for Orbán’s conception of an illiberal democracy is what he terms the “Asian model". This includes countries such as China, Singapore, and Russia, which he say have high social discipline and low public dissent. (Bıró-Nagy 2017, p. 36, Buzogány 2017, p. 1308) These countries, according to Orbán, are able to put the interests of the collective ahead of the individual, and therefore combine both an authoritarian government system with economic growth distributed equally

Illiberalism in Action

lliberalism’s implementation, however, worked far beyond its stated goals towards prosperity and the leveling of elites. There were two dimensions to the realization of illiberal democracy in Hungary, first is the economic dimension, and second is the political dimensions.

In the economic realm, a strong set of economic nationalist policies were implemented which Orbán referred to as “civic conservatism.” This stemmed directly from the disappointment with capitalism in Hungary following the fall of the socialist regime. (Bıró-Nagy 2017, p. 35) This meant a concerted effort to reaquire the shares lost during the rounds of privatization in critical sectors such as banking, telecommunication, and energy. This also included new taxes for foreign businesses operating in Hungary. This was all in an effort to strengthen the middle class and protect the country from external influences.

Another economic policy was a “workfare” targeting the “unproductive” sectors of the populations such as the rural, poor, and Roma. (Buzogány 2017, p. 1313) Orban himself envisions a “work-based” society where those who cannot or do not want to work will be forfeit certain rights. Politically, the Orbán’s party has gone to great lengths to establish itself as the primary party in power, first through a constitutional change, and further attempts to influence society even within formal democratic procedures. When Fidesz first entered power, it won a supermajority, and with that the power to change the constitution in the country. It quickly worked to change the “Fundamental Law,” greatly diminishing the independence of the judicial system which had extensive powers even within Europe as a whole.

This was followed up by the establishment of a new department with oversight over the media in the Hungary and domination of news sources with pro- government views. Furthermore, NGOs and civil society groups, especially those with foreign support were repressed, characterized by Orbán as foreign agents undermining Hungarian sovereignty.

All of this led to the EU’s criticism of Hungary’s democratic backslide, which only led to Hungary further being alienated from the EU and deepening Euroskepticism in the country. After EU’s criticism, Russo-Hungarian ties strengthened and Orbán began to speak more publicly about his admiration for the Russian state. A diversification in Hungary’s economic ties was followed up soon after, from depending on Western states towards expanding their ties with Eastern states such as Russia and China. This can be exemplified in Orbán’s quote that “While we sail under a Western flag, it is an Eastern wind that blows in the world economy.” (Buzogány 2017, p. 36)

Conclusion

Hungary’s backsliding in democracy was not a sudden shift that was unexpected, but rather based on historical experience and a political culture which resulted from it. The disappointment with the democratic process and capitalism combined with the political culture led to a wave of right-wing nationalism when a political crisis within the socialist party struck. Illiberal democracy is a conservative project that rejects the liberal democracy that many Hungarians blame for the extremely inequality and economic downturn in post-communist Hungary, and played on populist fears of an economic elite. This illiberal democracy’s implementation in Hungary has led to not just an economic nationalist project, but the start to a deterioration of democratic institutions which all put Fidesz at the core of Hungarian politics.

References

Bıró-Nagy, András (2017). “Illiberal democracy in Hungary: The social back- ground and practical steps of building an illiberal state”. In: Illiberal democ- racies in the EU: the Visegrad Group and the risk of disintegration, pp. 31– 44.
Buzogány, Aron (2017). “Illiberal democracy in Hungary: authoritarian diffusion or domestic causation?” In: Democratization 24.7, pp. 1307–1325.
Magyar, Kornélia (2010). The extreme-right in Hungary after the 2010 elections. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Last modified on 2023-05-04